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Abstract
Accounts of empathy distinguish between cognitive (attribution of mental states to a social
target) and emotional (sharing of emotions with a social target) empathy. To date, however,
little is known about whether and how (interactions between) person perceptions, situational
characteristics, and the observer-target relationship affect these constructs. The current
study hence investigated (a) how the perceived warmth and competence of different social
targets relate to both types of empathy, (b) whether there are differences in empathic
responding to positive vs. negative scenarios, and (c) the impact of identification with the
social targets. Eighty-nine participants rated cognitive and emotional empathy regarding
four stereotypical target characters (student, elderly person, businessperson, alcoholic per-
son) facing diverse positive and negative events. They also rated how warm and competent
these characters appeared to them and how strongly they identified with the social targets.
Results for cognitive and emotional empathy were partly overlapping, but demonstrated
several significant differences, thereby demonstrating the need to investigate the two con-
cepts separately. Notably, stereotypes of warmth predicted both cognitive and emotional
empathic responses more strongly in desirable than in undesirable scenarios, which may
relate to greater freedom of response to positive (rather than negative) social outcomes per-
mitted by society. Our data show that scenario valence mattered even more for cognitive
(than for emotional) empathy because it additionally moderated the effects of perceived
competence and social identification. Finally, both cognitive and emotional empathy
increased as a positive function of social identification, and social identification moderated
effects exerted by perceived warmth and competence (yet differently for the two types of
empathy investigated). Together, these findings speak to empathic responses arising from
a complex interplay between perceptions (i.e., warmth and competence), scenario valence,
and social identification.
PLOS ONE







Citation: Aue T, Bührer S, Mayer B, Dricu M (2021)
Empathic responses to social targets: The influence
of warmth and competence perceptions, situational
valence, and social identification. PLoS ONE 16(3):
e0248562. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0248562
Editor: Mariella Pazzaglia, University of Rome,
ITALY
Received: April 16, 2020
Accepted: March 2, 2021
Published: March 15, 2021
Copyright: © 2021 Aue et al. This is an open access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author and
source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the paper and its Supporting information
files.
Funding: This research was supported by grants
PP00P1_150492 and PP00P1_183709 of the
Swiss National Science Foundation (http://www.
snf.ch/en/Pages/default.aspx) to TA. The funders
had no role in study design, data collection and
analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the
manuscript.
Introduction
“Empathy is about finding echoes of another person in yourself.”
Mohsin Hamid
According to recent conceptions in the literature [1,2], empathy represents the existence of an
affective state in an observer that is isomorphic to the observed individual’s affective state. At
the same time, the observer is aware that his/her own affective response has been caused by the
monitored other’s response. Empathy is omnipresent in daily interactions and other social set-
tings (e.g., interpersonal perceptions); correspondingly, it has been diligently investigated in
recent years. While the number of studies conducted is impressive, there remain three major
points to be addressed. First, individuals’ empathic responses to different social targets are
clearly distinct [3–7], but it remains unclear as to how empathic responding relates to basic
person characteristics that an observer attributes to the social targets (i.e., warmth/communion
and competence/agency [8,9]). Second, little is known about whether differential empathic
responding to different social targets depends on situational characteristics or whether it is
reflected comparably across positive and negative scenarios. Third, testing is needed to deter-
mine whether increased identification with a social target results in increased empathic
responding, as well as whether this holds independently of person and situational characteris-
tics. The present work addresses these three aims.
Accounts of empathy most often distinguish between cognitive and affective components
([1,3,10–13]; for an additional motivational component, see [14]); hence we consider both
types of empathic responding here. Cognitive empathy is defined as being_related to an indi-
vidual’s capacity to adopt the perspective of another person and thus strongly depends on
mentalizing abilities. Cognitive empathy hence ensures that people understand other people’s
feeling states. The term emotional (or affective) empathy, in contrast, comprises the affective
component of empathy and describes an observer feeling the way that the monitored other
person must feel in a given scenario. A key element of emotional empathy, therefore, consists
of the sharing of emotions, which makes it distinct from related concepts such as sympathy,
empathic concern, and compassion (see [2], for details).
Support for a conceptual distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy is revealed
in behavioral [15–17], neural [18–20], brain morphological [12,21], and genetic [22,23] find-
ings. Although cognitive and emotional empathy are supposedly distinct (i.e., separate con-
structs), they are not conceptualized as independent. In fact, they have been suggested to be
complementary facets of empathy ([14,18]; see [24] for an overview of different models of pos-
sible relations between cognitive and emotional empathy).
Previous evidence demonstrates that target characteristics influence the amount of empathy
displayed by an observer. Specifically, earlier research has shown reduced (mostly emotional)
empathy for out-group members compared with that for in-group members [25–31], which
possibly relates to reduced moral processing mediated by the medial prefrontal cortex [32].
While suggestive, these observations call for further inspection. Essentially, one should ask
whether definable perceivable target characteristics can be systematically linked with differ-
ences in empathy arising in the observer. Undeniably, as we noted earlier, social targets as
members of different social groups are oftentimes perceived as being dramatically different in
terms of both their interpersonal and their personal intentions and capabilities [8,9]. Existing
theoretical models may assist with the identification of critical person characteristics that are
ascribed to unknown individuals and that may have the potential to alter empathic responding
in the observer.
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The Stereotype Content Model (SCM; [9,33,34]), for instance, categorizes social groups
along two orthogonal dimensions, namely, perceived warmth and competence (relating to
Abele and Wojciszke’s [8] conceptions of communion and agency, respectively). Whereas the
dimension of warmth can be conceived of as describing interpersonal intentions and capabili-
ties attributed to a social target, the dimension of competence more closely relates to attributed
personal intentions and capabilities. The four quadrants spanned by these two dimensions
have been suggested to evoke qualitatively different affective experiences, attitudes, and behav-
iors in an observer [9,33,35–38].
The few existing studies on the SCM that touch upon empathic responding do not explicitly
distinguish between cognitive and emotional empathy and include very low numbers of partic-
ipants. From their task instructions, we conclude that two studies have investigated emotional
empathy in response to the four quadrants of the SCM [39,40]. For undesirable events, respon-
dents reported feeling worst toward warm but incompetent targets (eliciting pity), followed by
warm and competent (pride) and cold and incompetent targets (disgust). The least emotional
empathy was shown for cold but competent characters that instilled envy [39,40]. Further-
more, for desirable events, respondents reported feeling significantly less good toward cold
and competent social targets (envy) than toward all other social targets, with no difference
between the latter [39,40]. Together, these observations converge with other behavioral find-
ings that suggest that seeing envied people in bad situations evokes Schadenfreude (i.e., mali-
cious joy; [41,42]; but see [43,44] for possible moderating influences) rather than empathy.
Thus, according to these studies, emotional empathy appears to be reduced for social targets
perceived as high in competence but low in warmth, and increased for those targets with attri-
butions of high warmth and low competence. By contrast, others [45] report more generally
that emotional empathy in the observer correlates positively with the perceived warmth (but
not competence) of a target.
Regarding cognitive empathy, there has been only preliminary functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging and behavioral evidence [46,47], suggesting that people engage in inattention,
dehumanization, and reduced mentalizing when seeing pictures of others perceived as cold
and incompetent (i.e., those instilling disgust; e.g., substance abusers). We assume that such
reduced social cognition may have direct consequences for an observer’s cognitive empathy.
Together, these observations suggest that the pattern of responses to the various target char-
acters might look different for cognitive and emotional empathy. Notably, to our knowledge,
no single study to date has tested both types of empathy for different combinations of per-
ceived warmth and competence in the same study (see e.g. [14]). Therefore, remaining to be
clarified is the degree to which the pattern of responses to different social targets is similar for
cognitive and emotional empathy. Accordingly, in the current study, we investigated how
attributions of warmth and competence relate to both cognitive and emotional empathy (Aim
1: Influence of perceived warmth and competence on cognitive and emotional empathy).
Specifically, we investigated empathic responding to four stereotypical characters, each of
which had been suggested to correspond to one of the four SCM quadrants spanned by the
basic perceptual dimensions warmth and competence [33–38]. A student represented the
warm and competent in-group of our student participants (instilling pride). The three remain-
ing characters referred to social out-groups: an elderly person (warm, incompetent; instilling
pity), a businessperson (cold, competent; instilling envy), and an alcoholic person (cold,
incompetent; instilling disgust). Relying on the literature reviewed above [39–42,45–47], we
expected cognitive empathy to be reduced for those perceived as low on both the warmth and
the competence dimensions (here represented by the alcoholic character). Emotional empathy,
in contrast, was expected to be especially reduced in targets perceived as cold but competent
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(here represented by the businessperson), but very high for targets perceived as warm and
incompetent (here represented by the elderly person).
Moreover, we admitted the possibility of these effects being moderated by the valence of the
experimental scenarios included. Research on empathy is most often based on seeing another
person in an undesirable scenario (e.g., pain, setbacks, or misfortunes), which emphasizes
comprehension (cognitive empathy) and sharing (emotional empathy) of negative feeling
states (e.g. [48,49], but see [16,39–42,50] for an investigation of positive feeling states arising
for undesirable scenarios). Less is known about (especially cognitive) empathy in desirable sit-
uations. In the present experiment, we hence assessed empathic responses in both undesirable
and desirable events (Aim 2: Comparison of empathic responses in undesirable vs. desirable
situations) in order to assess commonalities and differences in greater depth. Notably, as it
has been proposed that people more commonly engage in the search for explanations regard-
ing bad rather than good outcomes [51–53], we assumed that such differential engagement
exerts differential effects on cognitive and emotional empathy in undesirable vs. desirable sce-
narios. Instead of being based on time-consuming, effortful searches for explanations or justi-
fications, empathic responding to positive (rather than negative) outcomes might therefore
rely more strongly on stereotypical properties of the social targets. Accordingly, we expected a
stronger reliance on perceived warmth and competence when individuals rate their empathy
toward the social targets for desirable compared with undesirable scenarios.
Finally, empathy is further influenced by the observer-target relationship. For instance,
research has shown that empathic responses in an observer largely depend on factors such as
the perceived fairness and gender of a social target [7,45,54]. Similarity and closeness to as well
as familiarity with the observer are also influential [3,5,55]. Other factors determining
empathic responding relate to the observer-target relationship as defined by the experimental
setting (e.g., competition or cooperation, with competition leading to counter-empathic
responding; [45,56]). Together, these characteristics can be assumed to determine the extent to
which an observer identifies with another person. Correspondingly, we hypothesized that the
level of social identification would correlate positively with both cognitive and emotional
empathy (Aim 3: Association of social identification with cognitive and emotional empa-
thy). We had no directed hypothesis regarding possible interactions of social identification
with the two perceptual dimensions and scenario valence. The investigation of such interac-
tions, therefore, was explorative in nature.
To address our three aims, in the current study, we examined empathic responses to four
different characters (student, elderly person, businessperson, and alcoholic person) confront-
ing 32 different desirable and undesirable scenarios. For each of these 128 experimental trials,
participants reported their cognitive and their emotional empathy. The participants also rated
their degree of identification (i.e., perceived similarity) with the four characters and catego-
rized the characters according to perceived warmth and competence. From the reviewed litera-
ture, we hypothesized that (a) cognitive empathy would be reduced for targets perceived as
low in both warmth and competence (i.e., interactive effects of attributed warmth and compe-
tence); (b) emotional empathy would be reduced for targets perceived as low in warmth but
high in competence; and (c) emotional empathy would be increased for targets perceived as
high in warmth but low in competence. Together, these latter two hypotheses are consistent
with the idea that emotional empathy varies as a positive function of attributed warmth and as
a negative function of attributed competence. We further expected (d) a stronger reliance on
perceived warmth and competence for positive than for negative scenarios (for both cognitive
and emotional empathy) and (e) increasing cognitive and emotional empathy with increasing
levels of social identification.
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Materials and methods
Participants
Eighty-nine German-speaking University of Bern undergraduate students (80 females),
between 18 and 30 years of age (M = 22.2, SD = 2.36) were recruited via e-mails, flyers, and the
local participant pool of the University of Bern. Participants were compensated with either
course credits or monetary payment and gave informed and written consent for their partici-
pation. Experimental protocols, methods of data collection, data handling, and data analysis
were approved by the local ethics committee of the University of Bern and are fully in accord
with the Declaration of Helsinki [57].
Experimental task
Participants specified their cognitive and emotional empathy for 16 desirable and 16 undesir-
able events (see S1 Table for a list of included events) for four different characters (student,
elderly person, businessperson, alcoholic person; S1 and S2 Figs). The question for cognitive
empathy asked “In your opinion, how good/bad does the depicted character feel in this specific
situation?” (c.f., [58]) and therefore addressed metacognitive abilities. The question for emo-
tional empathy, in contrast, asked “How good/bad do you feel when you see the depicted char-
acter in this specific situation?” (cf. [40]) and thus assessed affective sharing. Responses to both
questions were given on continuous scales; the response format for these questions ranged
from -50 (“very bad”) to 50 (“very good”). Desirable and undesirable events were matched
with respect to event frequency and controllability (see S1 Table for details).
The four different characters referred to the four quadrants generated by the two dimen-
sions, perceived warmth and perceived competence, as specified in the SCM [9,33,34]. A still
animation of a student represented the in-group character for our student participant sample
and was supposed to be perceived as high in both warmth and competence. The three remain-
ing characters served as out-group characters: an elderly person (high warmth, low compe-
tence; associated with the experience of pity), a businessperson (low warmth, high
competence, associated with the experience of envy), and an alcoholic person (low warmth,
low competence; associated with the experience of disgust). The gender of the presented char-
acters was matched with the gender of the participant (S1 Fig). The pictures displayed aimed at
prompting the activation of the respective group stereotypes of warmth and competence, and
participants were instructed to view each character as a representative member for the specific
social group targeted. It can therefore be assumed that our participants considered the charac-
ters as a function of social group affiliations rather than as individual targets.
Participants also rated how warm and competent they perceived these characters to be
(manipulation check; S3 Fig, panel A). The character in question was displayed in the center of
the screen and participants could mark their choice on two continuous visual analog scales
(presented in two consecutive windows), ranging from 0 (“not at all warm”/“not at all compe-
tent”) to 100 (“very warm”/“very competent”). Lastly, participants also completed the Inclu-
sion of Other in the Self (IOS; [59]) scale, specifying the degree of perceived overlap between
themselves and any of the four target characters (S3 Fig, panel B). The IOS scale consists of
seven pairs of circles that vary in their degree of overlap—from 1 (very low overlap) to 7
(almost complete overlap). The participants’ task was to select, for each character, the pair of
circles that best described their relationship with this character.
Characters and backgrounds representing the different scenarios were created with The
Sims 4 (Electronic Arts, CA, USA). The resulting 128 visual stimuli (each of the four characters
displayed in each of the 32 scenarios) were controlled in brightness and contrast by using
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MATLAB R2017a (The Math Works, Inc., MA, USA). The experiment was programmed with
E-Prime 2.0 Professional (version 2.0.10.353; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA,
USA).
Procedure
Participants were informed that the aim of the study was the development of new stimuli for
upcoming studies. About half of the participants (n = 49 of 89 participants in total) were
equipped with sensors that captured diverse physiological responses (e.g., electrocardiogram;
data not presented in the present manuscript). After having signed a written informed consent
form, they engaged in six experimental blocks that were presented in a fixed sequence. The
first two blocks assessed (over)optimistic expectancies for the self and the different characters
displayed. These data are unrelated to the present research aims and have been analyzed sepa-
rately (see [60] for details). Consequently, they are not presented here. The fourth block
included ratings of subjective controllability, valence, frequency in the general population,
emotional impact, and personal experience for each of the 32 scenarios included (see S1 Table
for details) and are also not further considered.
Notably, the third block comprised ratings of cognitive and emotional empathy for all sce-
nario (n = 32) × character (n = 4) combinations (resulting in 128 ratings for each type of empa-
thy; see previous section; S2 Fig). The fifth block consisted of the completion of the IOS scale
(S3 Fig, panel B), with the aim of measuring social identification with the different characters
(four ratings in total). Finally, the sixth block comprised ratings for each character on the
dimensions warmth and competence (four ratings for each perceived warmth and perceived
competence; manipulation check; S3 Fig, panel A). Before our participants left the laboratory,
they were debriefed.
Data preparation and analysis
Data preparation
Cognitive and emotional empathy ratings for undesirable scenarios were reversed in order to
reflect the general appropriateness of the attributed (cognitive empathy) or experienced (emo-
tional empathy) feeling states (i.e., greater scores representing greater (assigned) suffering; we
note that the response scales ranged from– 50 [feeling “very bad”] to 50 [feeling “very good”]).
For the desirable scenarios, no recoding was needed because greater scores already reflected
more positive feelings attributed to the depicted character (cognitive empathy) or felt by the
participant (emotional empathy).
Data analysis
First, we calculated Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients in order to investigate
the distinctive character of the various constructs (cognitive and emotional empathy
expressed, social identification with the characters, and perceived warmth and competence of
the characters) included in our study. In addition to providing this information across all sce-
narios (i.e., entering averaged scores per participant across all scenarios considered), we
included separate correlation coefficients for negative (i.e., undesirable) and positive (i.e.,
desirable) scenarios.
We used linear mixed modeling to address all of our research aims, as implemented in the
GAMLj module in jamovi (The jamovi project (2020). jamovi. (Version 1.2) [Computer Soft-
ware]. Retrieved from https://www.jamovi.org.). One important reason for using this statistic
over traditional methods is that it allows us to account for both participant- and scenario-
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related variance in one model (see [61] for a more detailed account of the rationale for using
this approach, and [62] for a recent implementation of this method for repeated measures
designs). To elucidate any interaction effects, we used the simple effects procedure as imple-
mented in jamovi/GAMLj.
Two separate linear mixed models were computed to investigate our three research aims—
one for cognitive empathy and one for emotional empathy. Both models had a completely
crossed design, with crossed random effects for participants (n = 89) and scenarios (n = 32),
which were both at level 2, and with ratings of emotional and cognitive empathy, respectively,
for each of the four characters within each combination of participant and scenario (level 1
data). The first linear mixed model had cognitive empathy as the level 1 outcome, whereas the
second model had emotional empathy as the level 1 outcome. For both models, perceived
warmth (0–100) and perceived competence (0–100), as well as IOS (1–7), were level 1 continu-
ous predictors (centered on the mean). Valence (positive, negative) was a level 2 categorical
predictor, as it represented a characteristic of scenarios.
The manipulation check, based on our participants’ warmth and competence ratings for
the different characters, revealed, among other things, that the elderly character was not per-
ceived as incompetent as intended (S1 Analysis); therefore, we decided to include the partici-
pants’ actual ratings of warmth and competence in our analyses rather than relying on factors.
However, because warmth and competence have been used as categorical predictors in most
previous studies, we additionally ran the models with warmth (levels: cold, warm) and compe-
tence (levels: incompetent, competent) as factors. In these models (with warmth and compe-
tence as categorical predictors), random slopes of warmth and competence were included for
both subject variables (participants and scenarios) in addition to a random slope of valence for
the subject variable participants (since valence is an attribute of scenarios, its effect could vary
only across participants, not across scenarios). The results of these additional models are
described in S2 Analysis.
For the main analyses with perceived warmth and perceived competence as continuous level
1 predictors, including random slopes of these main effects prevented convergence, which led
to the decision of keeping only the participants’ random slope of valence for these models. All
models were estimated with an unstructured covariance matrix (correlated random effects).
The included random effect parameters were tested for significance by using likelihood ratio
(LR) test comparisons with models that did not contain the respective effect in question. For
both dependent variables, we started with an intercept-only model to estimate the intra-class
correlation coefficients (ICCs) related to the random intercepts of participants and scenarios.
In the next step, models with (perceived) warmth, (perceived) competence, valence, and IOS as
main (fixed) effects, as well as their two-way, three-way, and four-way interactions, were speci-
fied. To avoid over-parametrization and unnecessary (and therefore potentially biasing) par-
tialling of irrelevant higher order effects, we then removed all nonsignificant four- and three-
way interactions to arrive at the final model for the respective dependent variable (cognitive
empathy and emotional empathy; for details, see the respective analyses below). To obtain
effect sizes for the fixed effects, we additionally computed the models with grand-mean stan-
dardized dependent variables, as well as continuous predictors [63,64]. The resulting standard-
ized effect estimates bs represent the effects in the standard deviation metric and can therefore
be interpreted as independent of the scaling/variances of independent and dependent vari-
ables. In the case of a dichotomous categorical predictor, the predictor was not standardized,
as this would obscure the interpretation of the effects rather than elucidate it. The resulting
partially standardized effect represents a standardized mean difference between the groups
that the predictor represents and thus can be interpreted as being similar to Cohen’s d. Both
fully standardized effect estimates of continuous predictors and partially standardized effect
PLOS ONE Empathic responses to social targets
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248562 March 15, 2021 7 / 21
estimates of dichotomous predictors are referred to as bs below to avoid unnecessary complex-
ity in statistical notation.
Results
Correlations between the included variables
Table 1 and S2 Table (the latter providing separate correlations for the different targets and
valence levels) show the patterns of Pearson product-moment correlations between the vari-
ables included in our analyses. Unsurprisingly, our data demonstrate an overlap between the
two empathy measures. Yet, there was only about 30% of shared variance between the two con-
structs (which matches the earlier observed commonality between empathic concern and per-
spective taking across different populations; cf. [65]). Therefore, it was justified to perform
separate analyses for cognitive and emotional empathy.
Cognitive empathy (mentalizing, attribution of feelings)
The intercept-only model for cognitive empathy yielded ICCs of 0.134 and 0.239 for partici-
pants and scenarios, respectively, indicating that 13.4% of overall variance occurred among
participants and 23.9% among scenarios. The respective LR tests for the random intercept vari-
ances for participants and scenarios were both highly significant, with LR χ2(1) = 1884.930, p
< .001, and LR χ2(1) = 3419.969, p< .001, respectively. With regard to information criteria,
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) of the inter-
cept-only model were 91215.232 and 91241.881, respectively. For the model including all pre-
dictors (perceived warmth, perceived competence, valence, IOS), as well as all possible (two-
way, three-way, and four-way) interactions as fixed effects, AIC and BIC were 90247.508 and
90532.232, respectively. In this model, the four-way interaction (p = .730) and all four three-
way interactions were nonsignificant (perceived warmth × valence × IOS: p = .880; perceived
competence × valence × IOS: p = .062; perceived warmth × perceived competence × IOS: p =
.518; perceived warmth × perceived competence × valence: p = .608). After we removed the
nonsignificant four-way and three-way interactions, the information criteria
(AIC = 90242.322, BIC = 90427.630) of the final linear mixed model (including main effects
and all two-way interactions) were both lower than for the full model above, and the model
Table 1. Pattern of correlations between the different constructs.
Cognitive Empathy Emotional Empathy Social Identification Perceived Warmth
Emotional Empathy r .575���
p < .001
Social Identification r .109 .196
p .309 .066
Perceived Warmth r .126 .293�� .201
p .239 .005 .059
Perceived Competence r .228� .344��� .317�� .579���





n = 89 participants. Correlations are collapsed across all levels of target character and scenario valence.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248562.t001
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showed a significant random slope variance of valence across participants (LR χ2(2) = 275.771,
p< .001).
We predicted (a) cognitive empathy to be reduced for targets perceived as low in both
warmth and competence (i.e., interactive effects of attributed warmth and competence). Yet,
we did not observe a statistically significant interaction between perceived warmth and per-
ceived competence (F(1, 11256.2) = 1.61, p = .205) in the current study. Consistent with our
hypothesis of (b) greater effects of the perceptual dimensions in positive than in negative sce-
narios, however, the final model revealed a main effect of perceived warmth (F(1, 11262.8) =
147.27, p< .001) that was qualified by an interaction of perceived warmth with valence (F(1,
11039.5) = 98.60, p< .001). Simple effects analyses revealed that respondents reported higher
cognitive empathy for warm characters than for cold characters—particularly for the positive
scenarios (positive; b = 0.124, bs = 0.232; t(11296.3) = 15.66, p< .001; negative: b = 0.026, bs =
0.048; t(11233.7) = 3.22, p = .001) (see Fig 1, left panel). Furthermore, there was an interaction
of perceived competence with valence (F(1, 11259.6) = 116.32, p< .001): Cognitive empathy
varied as a negative function of perceived competence in the positive scenarios (b = -0.053, bs
= -0.101; t(11279.9) = -7.82, p< .001), but, somewhat surprisingly, as a positive function of
perceived competence in the negative scenarios (b = 0.033, bs = 0.063; t(11253.48) = 4.92, p<
.001) (see Fig 1, middle panel).
In addition, we predicted (c) that cognitive empathy would vary as a positive function of
social identification, and we explored possible interactions between social identification and
the other variables in the prediction of cognitive empathy. In accordance with our hypothesis,
we observed a main effect of the degree of social identification with the target character (F(1,
11257.9) = 6.87, p = .009), which was qualified by an interaction of degree of identification
with valence (F(1, 10389.8) = 15.64, p< .001). Simple effects showed that cognitive empathy
increased as a function of social identification with the target character during positive scenar-
ios (b = 0.514, bs = 0.067; t(11239.8) = 4.53, p< .001), whereas social identification did not
matter for negative scenarios (b = -0.054, bs = -0.007; t(11024.1) = -0.48, p = .633) (see Fig 1,
right panel).
Furthermore, we found an interaction of degree of identification with perceived warmth (F
(1, 11236.2) = 11.71, p< .001). Although all three simple slopes were significant, their positiv-
ity decreased with increasing social identification, indicating greater influence of perceived
warmth at low levels than at high levels of social identification (social identification = Mean– 1
SD: b = 0.099, bs = 0.183; t(11262.3) = 14.49, p< .001; social identification = Mean: b = 0.075,
bs = 0.140; t(11262.8) = 12.14, p< .001; social identification = Mean + 1 SD: b = 0.051, bs =
0.096; t(11249.4) = 4.61, p< .001) (see Fig 2, left panel).
A further significant interaction was observed for social identification and perceived com-
petence (F(1, 11262.8) = 4.95, p = .026). Simple effects analyses showed that when participants
barely identified with a target character, increasing perceptions of competence in a target
Fig 1. Simple effects of perceived warmth, perceived competence, and social identification on cognitive empathy
for negative and positive scenarios. Left panel: Warmth ratings and scenario valence; middle panel: Competence
ratings and scenario valence; right panel: Social identification and scenario valence. IOS = Inclusion of Other in the
Self scale, measuring the extent of social identification. SE = standard error.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248562.g001
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character were associated with decreasing cognitive empathy ratings (social
identification = Mean– 1 SD: b = -0.025, bs = -0.048; t(11262.8) = -3.04, p = .002). Notably, this
association between perceived competence and cognitive empathy ratings shrank with increas-
ing levels of social identification and was no longer significant for medium and high levels of
social identification (social identification = Mean: b = -0.010, bs = -0.019; t(11251.0) = -1.80, p
= .072; social identification = Mean + 1 SD: b = 0.005, bs = 0.010; t(11258.0) = 0.58, p = .562)
(see Fig 2, right panel). There was no main effect of valence (F(1, 31.9) = 0.05, p = .822) or
competence (F(1, 11251.0) = 3.25, p = .071).
Emotional empathy (affective sharing, own feelings)
The intercept-only model for emotional empathy revealed ICCs of 0.213 and 0.135 for partici-
pants and scenarios, respectively, indicating that 21.3% of overall variance occurred among
participants and 13.5% among scenarios. Random intercept variances for participants and sce-
narios were both highly significant, with LR χ2(1) = 2848.503, p< .001, and LR χ2(1) =
1939.140, p< .001, respectively. The AIC and BIC of the intercept-only model were 89855.762
and 89882.872, respectively. For the model that included all predictors (perceived warmth, per-
ceived competence, valence, IOS) and all possible (two-way, three-way, and four-way) interac-
tions as fixed effects, the AIC and BIC were 88381.350 and 88669.491, respectively. In this
model, the four-way interaction (p = .334) and three of the four three-way interactions were
nonsignificant (perceived warmth × valence × IOS: p = .457; perceived competence × valence
× IOS: p = .618; perceived warmth × perceived competence × valence: p = .065). After we
removed the nonsignificant four-way and three-way interactions, the information criteria
(AIC = 88381.144, BIC = 88593.167) of the final linear mixed model (including main effects,
all two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction perceived warmth × perceived
competence × IOS) were both lower than for the full model, and the model showed a signifi-
cant random slope variance of valence across participants (LR χ2(2) = 400.362, p< .001).
We expected emotional empathy to vary (a) as a positive function of perceived warmth and
(b) as a negative function of perceived competence. Moreover, we predicted (c) greater effects
of the perceptual dimensions in positive than in negative scenarios. In line with these hypothe-
ses, the final model revealed a main effect of perceived warmth (F(1, 11252.8) = 334.82, p<
.001), qualified by an interaction of perceived warmth with valence (F(1, 11169.7) = 18.29, p<
.001; Fig 3). Simple effects showed that respondents reported higher emotional empathy for
warm characters than for cold characters in both types of scenarios, but more so in the positive
Fig 2. Simple effects of perceived warmth and perceived competence on cognitive empathy at different levels of social
identification. Left panel: Warmth ratings and social identification; right panel: Competence ratings and social identification.
IOS = Inclusion of Other in the Self scale, measuring the extent of social identification; SE = standard error.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248562.g002
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scenarios (positive: b = 0.128, bs = 0.259; t(11287.8) = 17.09, p< .001; negative: b = 0.089, bs =
0.180; t(11275.9) = 11.88, p< .001). The main effect of perceived warmth was also qualified by
interactions with perceived competence and with levels of social identification (see below).
Consistent with our prediction of a negative link between attributions of competence and
emotional empathy, a significant main effect of perceived competence (F(1, 11260.0) = 32.02,
p< .001) indicated that overall, higher competence levels were related to lower emotional
empathy (b = -0.034, bs = -0.070), but this effect was qualified by interactions with several
other factors. Specifically, our analyses further yielded significant interactions between per-
ceived warmth and perceived competence (F(1, 11259.6) = 11.34, p< .001), between perceived
warmth and social identification (F(1, 11262.0) = 11.71, p< .001), and between perceived
competence and social identification (F(1, 11249.4) = 5.84, p = .016).
Notably, those effects were in turn qualified by a three-way interaction of social identifica-
tion with perceived warmth and perceived competence (F(1, 11261.7) = 16.25, p< .001; Fig 4),
which relates to our hypothesis that (d) cognitive empathy varies as a positive function of social
identification (including the exploration of possible interactions between social identification
and the other variables in the prediction of emotional empathy). For cold characters (perceived
warmth = Mean– 1 SD), emotional empathy increased as a function of social identification,
and this was relatively independent of level of perceived competence (perceived
competence = Mean– 1 SD: b = 0.594, bs = 0.084; t(11261.8) = 2.79, p = .005; perceived
competence = Mean: b = 0.463, bs = 0.065; t(11261.8) = 3.07, p = .002; perceived
competence = Mean + 1 SD: b = 0.331, bs = 0.047; t(11258.1) = 1.74, p = .081). With rising
Fig 4. Interaction effects between social identification, warmth, and competence on ratings of emotional
empathy. SE = standard error.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248562.g004
Fig 3. Simple effects of perceived warmth on emotional empathy for negative and positive scenarios.
SE = standard error.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248562.g003
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levels of perceived warmth, effects of social identification became more dependent on perceived
competence and thus more interactive. For warm characters (perceived warmth = Mean + 1
SD), emotional empathy increased as a function of social identification only if the character
was perceived as competent (perceived competence = Mean + 1 SD: b = 0.404, bs = 0.057; t
(11261.5) = 3.08, p = .002) and decreased as a function of social identification if the character
was perceived as having average competence (perceived competence = Mean: b = -0.173, bs =
-0.024; t(11256.5) = -1.98, p = .047) or being incompetent (perceived competence = Mean– 1
SD: b = -0.751, bs = -0.106; t(11257.6) = -4.57, p< .001) (see Fig 4). There were no significant
main effects of valence (F(1, 34.6) = 0.03, p = .862) or social identification (F(1, 11258.4) =
3.20, p = .074), nor were there statistically significant interaction effects between valence and
social identification (F(1, 10806.5) = 2.06, p = .151) or between valence and perceived compe-
tence (F(1, 11261.3) = 0.29, p = .593).
Discussion
Only a few studies [39,40,46,47] have investigated emotional empathic responding for varying
perceived target dimensions as defined by the SCM (i.e., warmth and competence). Although
some findings [45] are suggestive of the hypothesis that emotional empathy is more strongly
influenced by the dimension of warmth than by the dimension of competence, others point to
the possibility of combined effects of warmth and competence (e.g., [39,40]). Even less is
known about cognitive empathy. Given the assumption that cognitive and emotional empathy
are separate but interrelated concepts, an open issue is how strongly the findings for cognitive
and emotional empathy resemble each other. This question remains to be answered because
no single study, to our knowledge, has examined both types of empathy with the same experi-
mental paradigm [14]. Moreover, it is unknown as to how the valence of an imagined scenario,
on the one hand, and social identification with the social targets, on the other, might moderate
the influence of warmth and competence perceptions on cognitive and emotional empathy.
The current study was performed to address these questions.
The following set of hypotheses was established: We expected (a) cognitive empathy to
reveal interactive effects of attributed warmth and competence (i.e., to be reduced in social tar-
gets perceived as cold and incompetent); (b-c) emotional empathy to vary as a positive func-
tion of perceived warmth and as a negative function of perceived competence (resulting in
increased emotional empathy for targets perceived as high in warmth but low in competence,
and decreased emotional empathy for targets perceived as low in warmth but high in compe-
tence). Furthermore, we predicted (d) a stronger influence of attributed warmth and compe-
tence for desirable compared with undesirable events (for both types of empathy) and (e)
increases in cognitive and emotional empathy associated with increasing levels of social identi-
fication. In addition, we explored the possibility of interactions of social identification with the
two perceptual dimensions and scenario valence. Table 2 displays a summary of our findings
in relation to these hypotheses.
Cognitive empathy (mentalizing, attribution of feelings)
From the existent (preliminary) evidence in the field of perspective taking [46,47,66], we pre-
dicted interactive effects of attributed warmth and competence to result in reduced cognitive
empathy for individuals perceived as cold and incompetent (here represented by the alcoholic
character). We did not replicate this finding, however. In the analyses performed, none of the
interactions comprising warmth and competence turned out to be significant. Furthermore,
there were no main effects of perceived warmth and perceived competence. Instead, effects of
these perceptual dimensions were dependent on both the valence of a scenario and the level of
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identification with the social targets. Specifically, we observed the positive association between
participants’ warmth ratings and their specified cognitive empathy to be somewhat larger for
positive than for negative scenarios (note, however, that the association was significant in both
cases), which accords with the observation that people more commonly engage in the search
for explanations regarding bad outcomes than they do regarding good outcomes [51–53]. Our
results are thus in line with our hypothesis that empathic responding to positive outcomes
relies more strongly on the stereotypical properties of the social targets in question, thereby
bypassing time-consuming, effortful searches for explanations or justifications.
Notably, however, the existing significant interaction between perceived competence and
valence is not unequivocally consistent with such an interpretation. Whereas for positive sce-
narios higher cognitive empathy was expressed for low than for high competent social targets,
the reverse was true for negative scenarios. Therefore, our valence-specific processing hypothe-
sis regarding the impact of perceptual properties needs further investigation. One possibility
(among others) is that it holds for perceptions of warmth but not for perceptions of compe-
tence. Alternatively, the pattern arising for competence may possibly be explained by reference
to the specificities of the social characters included in our study. In general, the low competent
social targets (here represented by the alcoholic character and—to a lesser extent—the elderly
character; see S1 Analysis) should have been perceived as being in a worse overall state than
the high competent social targets (here represented by the student and the businessperson).
Therefore, the incompetent targets may have been assumed to not experience particularly
strong negative emotions if something undesirable (i.e., usual) happened, but instead to have
strong positive emotions if something desirable (i.e., unusual) happened (with the opposite
effect holding for the competent targets).
In line with our hypothesis, the degree of social identification significantly predicted cogni-
tive empathy, such that a higher level of identification with the characters was associated with
increased cognitive empathy. Yet, the significant interaction between IOS scores and scenario
valence revealed that this association held only for positive scenarios, and cognitive empathy
did not vary as a function of social identification for negative scenarios. This observation could
again point to a greater reliance on shortcut processing when stating cognitive empathy for
desirable rather than undesirable outcomes. Consistent with such an interpretation, society
tends to impose stricter rules on how to empathize in negative situations (everybody has the
right to feel bad), thereby not leaving much space for variations in cognitive empathy. By
Table 2. Summary of results.
Hypotheses Supported by available data?
Cognitive Empathy
- Interactive effects of perceived warmth and competence no
- Greater reliance on perceptual dimensions in positive
than in negative scenarios
yes (perceived warmth), no (perceived competence)
- Positive influence of social identification yes (positive scenarios), no (negative scenarios)
Emotional Empathy
- Positive influence of perceived warmth yes
- Negative influence of perceived competence yes (except for warm others that the participants
strongly identified with)
- Greater reliance on perceptual dimensions in positive
than in negative scenarios
yes (perceived warmth), no (perceived competence)
- Positive influence of social identification yes (except for warm incompetent others)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248562.t002
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contrast, there are no such rules for positive situations, hence letting people freely engage in
the attribution of stronger positive feelings to those who they more intimately identify with.
Moreover, the level of social identification interacted with both SCM perceptual dimen-
sions (interactions between IOS and perceived warmth and between IOS and perceived com-
petence). Specifically, although cognitive empathy for the warm characters was virtually
unaffected by the degree of social identification, cognitive empathy for the cold characters
increased as the degree of social identification also increased. Thus, increasing levels of warmth
reduced the positive effects of social identification on cognitive empathy. We attribute this to a
potential ceiling effect of the participants’ identification with the warm characters. Similarly,
increasing levels of social identification reduced the positive effects of warmth perceptions on
cognitive empathy, which speaks to a reduced reliance on perceptual properties attributed to a
social target in the case of strong social identification. The positive interaction between social
identification and perceived competence further supports such an interpretation of our data
because increasing levels of social identification additionally reduced the negative effect
exerted by increasing levels of competence.
Emotional empathy (affective sharing, own feelings)
Earlier research on the SCM suggested a positive association between perceived warmth and
displayed empathy (e.g., [67]). Furthermore, emotional empathy has been reported to be
inversely related to the level of competence attributed to a social target [39–42]. Thus, we pre-
dicted increasing levels of warmth to yield positive changes in emotional empathy and increas-
ing levels of competence to yield negative changes. Furthermore, these effects were thought to
be stronger for desirable than for undesirable outcomes (the latter being supposedly character-
ized by greater attempts at searching for explanations).
Results in the present study are mostly consistent with these hypotheses. First, we indeed
found convincing evidence for an influence of perceived warmth on emotional empathy that
was moderated by the valence of the scenarios. As expected, characters perceived as warm
evoked greater emotional empathy than did characters perceived as cold, and this was stronger
for positive than negative outcomes. This finding aligns well with the observation that we gen-
erally hold more positive attitudes for warm characters and display more favorable behaviors
toward them [9,33].
We further observed a significant main effect of perceived competence on emotional empa-
thy: Attributions of incompetence evoked greater emotional empathy than did attributions of
competence. Consistent with our predictions, the combination of these effects reveals that the
lowest emotional empathy was expressed for cold and competent (supposedly envied; repre-
sented by the businessperson) targets. Thus, sharing emotions with envied social groups or
individuals may be particularly difficult [67,68]. Positive feelings arising from seeing others
experience desirable outcomes may be especially troublesome for those social targets that are
perceived as already owning excessive parts of the available resources. Similarly, there is no
reason why people should feel very bad about a misfortune happening to a person who they
usually begrudge.
Our expectations of the highest emotional empathy being displayed toward the warm-
incompetent subgroup (i.e., the elderly character), however, was not unequivocally supported
(which may be related to the fact that the elderly character did not adequately map into its
intended SCM quadrant; see S1 Analysis). In lieu of this, stereotypes of warmth and compe-
tence interacted with the degree of social identification to determine the levels of emotional
empathic responses. This finding thus underscores that—instead of solely focusing on per-
ceived warmth and competence—it is in further essential to consider the extent of
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identification with a social target. Respondents reported higher emotional empathy for the
cold characters the more strongly they identified with these characters–independent of the
level of competence displayed (Fig 4, left panel, shows in addition that—consistent with our
interpretation of the data in the previous paragraph—the cold-competent subgroup was char-
acterized by the lowest emotional empathy at each level of social identification). By contrast,
for warm characters, emotional empathy increased as a function of social identification only if
the target was perceived as competent, but unexpectedly decreased as a function of social iden-
tification if the target was perceived as incompetent. In sum, therefore, social identification
with another person generally increased emotional empathy (which aligns with our hypothesis
regarding the impact of social identification on emotional empathy), except for those targets
that had been perceived as warm and incompetent. It remains to be clarified why the effect is
reversed in their case.
Comparison of effects observed for cognitive and emotional empathy
Results for cognitive and affective empathy were only partly overlapping, justifying our sepa-
rate analyses for these constructs. Although it was true that warmth effects were similarly mod-
erated by scenario valence in the prediction of both types of empathy, there were two
noteworthy differences. First, scenario valence mattered more for cognitive than for emotional
empathy because it additionally moderated the effects of perceived competence and social
identification in the former case. Second, for cognitive empathy, increasing levels of social
identification boosted the cognitive empathy reported and reduced the positive effects exerted
by (a) elevated levels of warmth and (b) reduced levels of competence, with no interaction
between warmth and competence ratings. By contrast, for emotional empathy, social identifi-
cation interacted with both perceived warmth and perceived competence: Stronger identifica-
tion with a social target resulted in increased emotional empathy expressed, except for warm-
incompetent targets. These observed differences need further investigation.
Limitations
Assessment of empathy in the current studies might be criticized. First, from earlier findings
in the literature [40], we decided not to ask people separately how bad or how good they felt
(or thought that the social target felt, for cognitive empathy) about imagining the different
social targets in the depicted scenarios. However, results might have been different if we had
opted to assess those two questions separately for both cognitive and emotional empathy. For
instance, there might be value in assessing ambivalent emotional reactions to stimuli that can
only be measured by assessing positive and negative feelings on separate scales [69]. Further-
more, earlier research on undesirable situations suggests that positive affective responses aris-
ing in an observer when seeing the misfortune of another relate to dispositional cognitive
empathy, whereas negative affective responses relate to dispositional emotional empathy [16].
Although our study assessed cognitive and emotional empathy as situationally based (instead
of targeting dispositions), these considerations warrant further inspection. Therefore, in future
investigations, may want to separate positive and negative affective responses for both undesir-
able and desirable scenarios.
Second, it might be questioned whether high scores on the scale included in the current
study adequately address cognitive empathy for the different characters. It is imaginable that
those participants who denote that the social target is feeling particularly bad when facing a
misfortune might exaggerate or overestimate those feelings, thereby demonstrating reduced
rather than increased mentalizing capacities. However, this criticism must be addressed in
the larger context of the entire research field and is not specific to the current study (notably,
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the methods that we used here are consistent with those of earlier research in the area; e.g.,
[39,40]).
Finally, the existence of gender differences in empathic responding [70,71] points to the
possibility of quantitatively or qualitatively divergent determinants of cognitive and emotional
empathy between men and women. Given that about 90% of our participants were female, the
generalization of the present findings to both genders is questionable. Similar studies need to
be conducted with (predominantly) male samples.
Future directions
In future investigations in the field, researchers may consider the inclusion of psychophysiologi-
cal measures such as facial electromyography or cardiac responding because they might reveal
important insights that cannot be obtained with self-reported empathy (for evidence, see [40]).
In fact, subjective ratings have been reported to be particularly prone to social desirability effects
(for an overview of problematic issues related to self-reports, see [72]; for potential solutions,
see [73,74]), which might bias research findings considerably. However, our findings for cogni-
tive and emotional empathy are mostly in line with previous neuroimaging research and theo-
retical frameworks, thus increasing our trust in the reliability of the methodology used.
It would also be interesting to examine whether individualizing descriptions of the social
target characters included in the current study—in particular descriptions regarding the tar-
gets’ mental states—change the pattern of responses observed. Recent findings in the field
imply that such descriptions can decrease parochial empathy (i.e., intergroup empathy bias
representing greater empathy expressed for in-groups [32,75]).
Subsequent studies may further examine similarities and differences between affective and
cognitive empathy for the different social targets, on the one hand, and feelings expressed for
the self, on the other. Such a distinction would thus extend the differentiation between “imag-
ining self” and “imagining other” made by other authors in studies on empathy and perspec-
tive taking [76,77] into “imagining self” vs. “imagining other—cognitive empathy” vs.
“imagining other—emotional empathy.”
Finally, predominant approaches in the literature (e.g., [8,45]) claim a primacy of percep-
tions of warmth (i.e., communal content) over competence (i.e., agentic content) in social
interactions. Recent developments in the area (e.g., [8]) further suggest that the weight given
to each content depends on the kind of perspective taken by an individual. Specifically, stron-
ger ponderation of warmth (than of competence) should arise if one adopts an observer or
recipient perspective in social interactions, with the reverse holding true for the adoption of an
actor perspective. In the current study, one might be tempted to assume that participants
adopted an observer perspective (the focus being on the social target and not on the self, com-
bined with the target “receiving” desirable or “undesirable” outcomes). If this were true, it
would imply that our results do not support the idea of such differences being transferrable to
the empathy context. Yet, we did not assess the type of perspective taken by our participants.
In subsequent studies, researchers may therefore consider systematic manipulations of per-
spective taking.
Summary and conclusions
Accounts of empathy distinguish between cognitive (attribution of mental states to others) and
emotional (sharing of emotions with a social target) empathy and have led to numerous investi-
gations in the field. Advantages of the current study over earlier investigations relate to (a) the
simultaneous assessment of cognitive and affective empathy (i.e., with the same experimental
paradigm; [14]) for various social targets that can be classified along two universal dimensions
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of social perception (i.e. warmth and competence); (b) the consideration of both positive and
negative scenarios; and (c) the additional examination of social identification.
Perceived warmth and competence predicted empathic responses in positive situations but
a little less in negative situations, which may be explained by greater personal liberty of
response to positive (rather than to negative) social outcomes. Although society exerts general
pressure on people to display regret toward others who suffer misfortunes (instead of showing
malicious joy), it does not require the display of joy toward other people’s fortunes. Our results
thus clearly demonstrate the importance of considering the desirability of the situation when
investigating effects related to cognitive and emotional empathy.
Moreover, our findings related to social identification open the possibility of promoting
empathic responses—especially toward cold social targets—by manipulating the degree of
social identification. Social identification can be boosted in multiple ways. The most direct and
intuitive method is to establish more common ground (e.g., beliefs, values) between oneself
and another person. However, this might not always be feasible. An alternative method con-
sists of increasing the comparative fitness between the self and target other by determining a
common “antagonistic” environment [78,79]. For example, social campaigns against the mar-
ginalization of groups perceived as unfriendly, untrustworthy, or unpredictable (e.g., immi-
grants or those struggling with mental illness) could adapt their message by emphasizing that
both the audience of the campaign and the marginalized individuals share the same daily has-
sles or basic needs (i.e., the same environment).
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70. Schulte-Rüther M., et al., Gender differences in brain networks supporting empathy. Neuroimage,
2008. 42(1): p. 393–403. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.04.180 PMID: 18514546
71. Christov-Moore L., et al., Empathy: gender effects in brain and behavior. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral
Reviews, 2014. 46: p. 604–627. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.09.001 PMID: 25236781
72. Kalton G. and Schuman H., The effect of the question on survey responses: A review. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society: Series A (General), 1982. 145(1): p. 42–57.
73. Koivula A., Räsänen P., and Sarpila O. Examining Social Desirability Bias in Online and Offline Sur-
veys. in International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction. 2019. Springer.
74. Sassenrath C. and Science P., “Let Me Show You How Nice I Am”: Impression Management as Bias in
Empathic Responses. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2019: p. 1948550619884566.
75. Bruneau E.G., Cikara M., and Saxe R., Minding the gap: Narrative descriptions about mental states
attenuate parochial empathy. PloS one, 2015. 10(10). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0140838
PMID: 26505194
76. Lamm C., Batson C.D., and Decety J., The neural substrate of human empathy: effects of perspective-
taking and cognitive appraisal. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 2007. 19(1): p. 42–58. https://doi.
org/10.1162/jocn.2007.19.1.42 PMID: 17214562
77. Ruby P. and Decety J., How would you feel versus how do you think she would feel? A neuroimaging
study of perspective-taking with social emotions. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 2004. 16(6): p.
988–999. https://doi.org/10.1162/0898929041502661 PMID: 15298786
78. Voci A., Relevance of social categories, depersonalization and group processes: Two field tests of self-
categorization theory. European Journal of Social Psychology, 2006. 36(1): p. 73–90.
79. Turner J.C., et al., Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. 1987: Basil Blackwell.
PLOS ONE Empathic responses to social targets
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248562 March 15, 2021 21 / 21
